China’s Grip on Cambodia’s Ream Base Tightens despite Japan’s Visit

Earlier this month, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, alongside a Chinese military delegation, inaugurated the newly-upgraded Ream Naval Base. Shortly after, Cambodia and China reinforced their security ties with joint military drills, focusing on maritime operations and disaster response near the base.

Addressing concerns, Hun Manet asserted the base’s openness, emphasizing that foreign vessels—not just Beijing’s—would be welcome. Japan’s warships, Bungo and Etajima, arrived as part of a goodwill tour spanning 11 nations, marking a significant moment in regional naval diplomacy

The Japanese Embassy in Phnom Penh hailed the visit as a milestone in defence cooperation, noting Cambodia’s willingness to grant access to all nations. In a diplomatic nod to China, Miyoshi Asagi, Counsellor at Japan’s Embassy, emphasized the significance of freedom of navigation and a rules-based international order.

Despite Japan’s vessels being the first foreign warships at Ream, analysts caution that the base’s upgrades—funded by Beijing—will likely extend China’s strategic influence across the Gulf of Thailand and the contested waters of the South China Sea.

Since 2022, China has played a key role in modernizing Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base, constructing deep-water piers, dry docks, and a joint logistics centre. Despite Phnom Penh’s insistence that the base won’t become a permanent Chinese military hub, Western analysts remain skeptical, questioning the privileges Beijing’s navy may receive.

Concerns first surfaced in 2019 when reports emerged of a secret Cambodian-Chinese agreement granting China access for three decades. The upgrades align with Beijing’s broader strategy to expand its maritime footprint in Southeast Asia.

At the Ream Naval Base inauguration, Prime Minister Hun Manet reaffirmed Cambodia’s commitment to sovereignty, stressing that no foreign military would establish an exclusive base on its soil. Despite these assurances, Beijing’s influence at the facility remains undeniable, with preferential access raising concerns among analysts.

The Cambodia-China Joint Logistics and Training Centre, a focal point of speculation, is set to host annual Golden Dragon drills. Mere days after the ceremony, the latest iteration of these joint exercises commenced, underscoring deepening military ties.

China’s Ministry of National Defence clarified via the state-run Global Times that the Joint Logistics and Training Centre is not directed at any third party, though personnel from both nations will ensure its operation.

Military expert Zhang Junshe outlined its dual role: joint support and coordinated training. He emphasized that exercises conducted there will strengthen military cooperation to tackle regional security threats. The centre’s recurring joint drills and persistent Chinese presence suggest that Beijing will maintain enduring access to the Ream Naval Base.

China’s presence at Ream Naval Base opens doors for discreet intelligence gathering. Advanced radar systems and potential data-sharing with Cambodia could enable Beijing to track air and sea activity near southern Vietnam.

The base’s location strengthens China’s naval reach, quietly tightening its grip on critical maritime routes. Positioned along Cambodia’s southern coast, Ream provides direct access to the Malacca Strait—a vital artery for China, handling the bulk of its oil and LNG imports.

In a South China Sea conflict, Beijing could rapidly reinforce its forces at Ream Naval Base, using it as a strategic outpost. The facility also offers leverage over the Malacca Strait, allowing China to control vital maritime routes and disrupt enemy reinforcements.

Analyst Brian Wong notes that Beijing’s investments align with its broader plan to secure supply chains and bypass regional chokepoints under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Beijing’s presence at Ream Naval Base appears poised for long-term continuity, reinforcing its broader strategy in Cambodia. The base is not an isolated case but part of a larger network of dual-use infrastructure projects China has developed over the past decade.

Key examples include Dara Sakor International Airport, Siem Reap Angkor International Airport, the Mekong canal, Kampot Logistics and Port, the Phnom Penh-Sihanoukville Expressway, and the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone, all enhancing Beijing’s strategic footprint.

China’s BRI is driving the construction of strategic dual-use infrastructure across Cambodia, reinforcing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s civil-military fusion strategy. Many BRI projects in recipient nations are designed to meet military standards.

Research from Observer Research Foundation reveals that out of the US$15 billion invested in Cambodia, US$9.6 billion has been allocated to projects incorporating dual-use methodologies, strengthening China’s regional influence and military reach.

China’s deepening ties with Cambodia have triggered unease in Hanoi and Washington, both key players in the Gulf of Thailand. As Cambodia-China cooperation grew, relations between Phnom Penh and Washington took a downturn.

Tensions flared in 2021 when a U.S. defence attaché was denied full access to Ream Naval Base, followed by the demolition of U.S.-funded buildings. Cambodian authorities denied Chinese involvement, yet as Ream’s reconstruction progressed, military collaboration between Cambodia and the U.S. faded, highlighting the shifting regional dynamics.

Despite possessing a formidable naval fleet, China’s PLA Navy lacks a global network of bases, limiting its ability to project power on a scale comparable to the U.S. Recognizing this gap, Beijing has strategically pursued dual-use port developments across Asia and Africa.

Its sole official overseas military base is in Djibouti, but facilities like Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Bata in Equatorial Guinea, and Gwadar in Pakistan serve as crucial outposts. Ream Naval Base in Cambodia fits this pattern, offering China strategic positioning near key maritime trade routes while avoiding the scrutiny that a permanent overseas military base would invite.

(eng.mizzima.com)